Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological articulation of embodiment’s central place in knowing, being-in-the-world and expression resulted in one of the first posthumanist philosophies. Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology led him away from several of the Enlightenment’s human-centered tenets to an ontology that altered the status of humans to no longer holding a place of superiority to other beings of the natural world or of being the exclusive communicator to other beings, symbol makers or apprehender of the world’s sense. The trajectory of Merleau-Ponty’s thought progressed from an emphasis on the body-self as located in a felt dialogue with all surrounding beings within its perceptual perspective as human’s primary access to reality towards an ever widening sense that each moment of perception is a fission into the depths of the world in which humans are decentered into a matrix of experiential fields that was a collaboration of myriad beings. The ontology that he arrived at of “the flesh of the world” means that perception is inseparable from the various crisscrossing modes of the memorial, imaginal, kinetic, intuitive, proprioceptive, and intellectual in a dynamic, ever-transformative coproduction with interrelated beings. This dialogue with the world is prereflective and renders rationality as only possible given a more primordial apprehension of the world shared with many forms of animality. This essay shows how Merleau-Ponty’s ideas displace the human from the center of Being to being a part of a matrix of sense that is posthuman. Merleau-Ponty may have offered the most compelling form of posthumanism in that it is an articulation of an epistemology and ontology of embodiment which re-envisions humanity’s capacities as founded through its animal body and places humans within the depths of the natural world and not as its center.