Differential-linear cryptanalysis is a well-known cryptanalytic method combining differential and linear cryptanalysis. Since its introduction, it has become one of the most important tools for analyzing block ciphers. This paper focuses on differential-linear key-recovery attacks and presents a more efficient key-recovery algorithm by incorporating the partial-sum technique. This algorithm enables the key recovery attack to be divided into multiple steps, and the time complexity of a differential-linear key-recovery attack can be significantly reduced by carefully treating each step. Using this algorithm, we propose the first 19-round differential-linear key-recovery attacks on the message processing phase of GIFT-COFB and HyENA, which are currently the best-known attacks against these ciphers. Additionally, we extend the differential-linear attack on GIFT-64 to 19 rounds, surpassing the previous differential-linear attack by one round. We note that the attack results in this paper are far from threatening the security of GIFT-COFB, HyENA, and GIFT-64.