In this chap. I consider some questions regarding the nature of corruption in the pharmaceutical industry. I also consider how these questions might relate to moral deliberation in healthcare settings and other situations that bioethicists and healthcare ethicists might typically consider, which for the sake of brevity I will refer to as bioethical deliberation. My goal is not to provide a detailed analysis of the industry nor its many troubling practices. Instead I focus on conceptual and definitional issues. I approach the topic through the lens of thick and thin concepts. Thin concepts are judgments like good and bad and permissible and prohibited. These judgments are quite general in nature and do not imply much. Thick concepts, on the other hand, are more specific, more descriptive, carry more normative weight, and imply action. Examples include honest and dishonest and enticing and forbidden. Corruption is also a thick concept: it is more specific and descriptive than bad and implies that an action should not take place or should be prevented. Whether it implies the same thing in all contexts, however, is an open question. The universalism embedded in the thickness of corruption may carry significant risks when operationalized outside of the Western tradition of moral reasoning in which it was originally formulated. Or it may not. One of the goals of this chapter is to struggle with this question.