This concluding chapter not only summarizes the content of the main chapters, but also makes explicit how naturalism defended here relates to other key isms (especially historicism, pragmatism, irrealism, and pluralism), as well as how it transforms our understanding of the human epistemic condition. I specifically argue that if naturalism is conceived as a methodologically and metaphysically opportunistic epistemological project, it is not set in opposition to what is often called “historicism,” meaning the approaches that operationalize histories and/or genealogies when explaining socio-cultural practices or processes. Also, towards the end, I reflect on whether such a naturalism has any practical force (for doing philosophy). This ultimately leads me to embrace the notion of “conversational pragmatism,” originally introduced by Rorty.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

A Pragmatist Gambit

  • Michal Hubálek

摘要

This concluding chapter not only summarizes the content of the main chapters, but also makes explicit how naturalism defended here relates to other key isms (especially historicism, pragmatism, irrealism, and pluralism), as well as how it transforms our understanding of the human epistemic condition. I specifically argue that if naturalism is conceived as a methodologically and metaphysically opportunistic epistemological project, it is not set in opposition to what is often called “historicism,” meaning the approaches that operationalize histories and/or genealogies when explaining socio-cultural practices or processes. Also, towards the end, I reflect on whether such a naturalism has any practical force (for doing philosophy). This ultimately leads me to embrace the notion of “conversational pragmatism,” originally introduced by Rorty.