In this chapter, I present Quine’s fragmented and often forgotten views on writing history. However, this needs to be done in conjunction with an examination of his notion of science as our “total world-picture.” Quine elegantly avoids the task of specifying a demarcation criterion of science. The result is to position science as a Wittgensteinian language game that gradually expanded from its purpose of predicting our experiences and became socio-historically institutionalized set of practices. Thus, this chapter has two aims; first, I analyze Quine’s idiosyncratic, post-positivist concept of science with a particular focus on his inclusion of sciences that are traditionally labeled as soft or social. Then, second, I indicate how Quine deals with historical inquiry. When taken together, this chapter can also be read as a case study analysis of Quine’s take on all non-experimental modes of scientific inquiry, and, more broadly, his special account of naturalism and pragmatism.