In this chapter, I turn my attention to the issue of the seeming incommensurability between two equally indispensable ways of understanding ourselves-in-the-world: our normativist self-image and our causal-naturalistic self-image. My suggestion is that both these frameworks are best understood as fractured projections of processual reality. To this end, I first stress the irreducibility yet also ‘parallelism’ of the space of reasons (norms) and the space of causes (facts) and suggest that these relations as a package deal are an essential part of a metaphysical view (itself a sophistication of our common-sense view of the world after modernity) that Brandom calls ‘bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism’ (Brandom, A spirit of trust: A reading of Hegel’s phenomenology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2019). I then propose that Brandom’s conceptual realism and modal realism (that articulate our ordinary descriptive metaphysics about reasons, causes and their relations) can be understood as indispensable ‘ladder languages’ that can yet be eventually transcended by a naturalistic process metaphysics—where both causes and reasons are understood as different ways of being processes.

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Norms and Facts as Fractured Projections of Processual Reality

  • Dionysis Christias

摘要

In this chapter, I turn my attention to the issue of the seeming incommensurability between two equally indispensable ways of understanding ourselves-in-the-world: our normativist self-image and our causal-naturalistic self-image. My suggestion is that both these frameworks are best understood as fractured projections of processual reality. To this end, I first stress the irreducibility yet also ‘parallelism’ of the space of reasons (norms) and the space of causes (facts) and suggest that these relations as a package deal are an essential part of a metaphysical view (itself a sophistication of our common-sense view of the world after modernity) that Brandom calls ‘bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism’ (Brandom, A spirit of trust: A reading of Hegel’s phenomenology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2019). I then propose that Brandom’s conceptual realism and modal realism (that articulate our ordinary descriptive metaphysics about reasons, causes and their relations) can be understood as indispensable ‘ladder languages’ that can yet be eventually transcended by a naturalistic process metaphysics—where both causes and reasons are understood as different ways of being processes.