Building on the discussion of Chap. 9 , this chapter argues that normative freedom and non-normative freedom prescribe divergent regulative ideals that cannot be algorithmically synthesized at the level of collective ethico-political theory and practice. The regulative ideal at the heart of our conception of normative freedom is expressed by the universalist impulse for collective (semantic, epistemic, moral) self-mastery while the regulative ideal of our non-normative conception of freedom is expressed by the ‘particularist’ impulse for unhinged monadic material empowerment. It is suggested that in order to achieve an optimal balance between these regulative ideals we must opt for what I call ‘democratic prometheanism’. I examine the implications of this view on the issue of climate change: the democratic prometheanist view, among other things, implies that humans are essentially normatively defined as persons, and not as a distinct and hierarchically superior metaphysical category called ‘humanity’. From this point of view, humans as complex natural processes are ultimately conceived non-hierarchically, as being in a mutually symbiotic relationship with the social and environmental niches to which they are intertwined. This change of focus comes with a higher sensitivity to the strong interdependence relations that exist between our form of life, other living beings and the environment, and this necessitates reconceiving promethean freedom in terms of controlled interdependence.