Why is it Challenging to Overcome, Minimize or Regulate MEV?
摘要
With the increasing popularity of high-frequency trading and decentralized finance (DeFi) applications, it has become essential to implement protections for regular users of DeFi platforms against large parties with massive amounts of resources, allowing them to engage in market manipulation strategies like the maximum extractable value (MEV). MEV can be extracted using the Bellman-Ford flow algorithm, making it easy for bots to realize MEV in DeFi. In classical trading, front-running is illegal and is classified under the umbrella of insider trading. However, the classical approaches to the mitigation of MEV do not apply to DeFi applications, as the mitigation of classic insider trading is based on central enforcement through legal laws. DeFi has in it both blockchain platforms and automated market makers (AMM) on decentralized exchanges (DEX), which introduces additional stakeholders that are virtual/anonymous for which the fear of legal laws/suits do not apply. Hence, a variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature to overcome or minimize MEV. In this paper, first, we illustrate various MEV attacks in classical trading, show how MEV can be exploited algorithmically, and discuss mitigation techniques to overcome MEV in classical trading. Secondly, we show that the same mitigation techniques for overcoming MEV in DeFi do not apply as additional stakeholders are introduced. Thirdly, we describe the design of a robust AMM on XRPL blockchain ledger that overcomes MEV. From such a design on XRPL which is one of the widely used blockchain platforms that has several constraints as compared to the general permissionless or permissioned blockchain platforms, we discuss issues of overcoming MEV in general DeFi applications. It is argued that such limitations necessitate a practical regulatory approach supported by a good forensic methodology with tools to instill confidence in the use of DeFi.