Why do states who are not threatened deploy their armed forces in various speeds and sizes? After the closure of the Afghanistan mission in March 2014, and the return of almost all military personnel to Canada, the government was presented with a distinctive opportunity to “re-set” the overseas posture of its armed forces. This concluding chapter acknowledges that throughout the decision-making process–based on both departmental mandates and departmental self-interests and contrary to established Civil-Military Relations,–federal bureaucracies did act as veto players and were able to demonstrate substantial influence on the speed and size of Canadian military deployments. Here, I conclude that Bureaucratic Intervention Theory better explains military interventions and their variations through consensus building. The chapter also emphasizes possibilities for future research, as well as the theoretical and practical implications for both scholars and practitioners which are worthy of further consideration. Overall, this book demonstrates that Bureaucratic Intervention Theory, when applied to a federal bureaucracy, has greater explanatory powers than had been previously understood, contributes to an enhanced understanding of the current executive decision-making process, and helps illustrate the bureaucratic consensus-based approach currently used to manage how the Canadian Armed Forces is deployed.