Why do states who are not threatened deploy their armed forces in various speeds and sizes? After the closure of the Afghanistan mission in March 2014, and almost all military personnel serving overseas were returned to Canada, the Canadian government was presented with a distinctive opportunity to “re-set” the overseas posture of its armed forces. This chapter, the last of four empirical case studies, uses a negative case-study or non-deployment tell a complete story of Canadian post-Afghanistan military deployments. Here, I examine the Canadian Armed Forces non-deployment to Colombia (OPERATION CHALLENGE) where after a long period of consideration the bureaucracy was unable to reach a consensus because the various departments could not agree that the operation, even a small one, was in their own interests. Seen through Bureaucratic Intervention Theory, the non-deployment to Colombia demonstrates how federal departments, were unable to reach a consensus and were ultimately successful in avoiding a military contribution to the United Nations. Based on anonymous interviews with senior public servants and military officers, I conclude that, contrary to established Civil-Military Relations, within the federal bureaucracy disagreements between self-interested federal organizations were able to delay the development of a military recommendation from reaching the executive, and in this case veto any military deployment – until the United Nations found other contributing states.