Why do states who are not threatened deploy their armed forces in various speeds and sizes? After the closure of the Afghanistan mission in March 2014, and the return of almost all military personnel to Canada, the government was presented with a distinctive opportunity to “re-set” the overseas posture of its armed forces. This chapter, the first of four and least contentious empirical case study, addresses the Canadian Armed Forces deployment to Iraq and Kuwait (OPERATION IMPACT)—the largest and fastest Canadian Armed Forces deployment–where the Canadian government deployed a relatively large contingent quickly because the bureaucracy was able to arrive at a consensus in a matter of weeks. Through the theoretical lens of Bureaucratic Intervention Theory, I interpret the Canadian contribution to the counter-ISIL campaign, focusing on several federal departments (including the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces, Global Affairs Canada, Privy Council Office, Treasury Board and Finance) who each played a role in the decision-making process. Based on anonymous interviews with senior public servants and military officers, I conclude that there were few veto players, that there was little preference to decline or delay the mission and have the military remain in Canada, and that there was a high level of consensus among the self-interested departments. Because of these features, Canada’s public service was able to agree quickly and recommend Cabinet deploy the military in a relatively large number.