In 2024, Harrison and Haines examined the applicability of STARKs in the context of homomorphically tallied elections. While their work ensures the Recorded-as-Cast and Tallied-as-Recorded properties of a voting system, it lacks Cast-as-Intended verification and does not provide a coercion mitigation mechanism. In this work, we address these challenges and propose an updated voting protocol that achieves all three verification properties, at the same time providing coercion resistance by allowing re-voting. Our approach leverages vector commitment schemes with update mechanisms. We implement our protocol and provide comparative benchmarks to the Harrison and Haines solution. Our approach significantly outperforms the latter, allowing processing a considerably larger number of votes within the same hardware limits.

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End-To-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Partially Private Bulletin Boards

  • Valeh Farzaliyev,
  • Jan Willemson

摘要

In 2024, Harrison and Haines examined the applicability of STARKs in the context of homomorphically tallied elections. While their work ensures the Recorded-as-Cast and Tallied-as-Recorded properties of a voting system, it lacks Cast-as-Intended verification and does not provide a coercion mitigation mechanism. In this work, we address these challenges and propose an updated voting protocol that achieves all three verification properties, at the same time providing coercion resistance by allowing re-voting. Our approach leverages vector commitment schemes with update mechanisms. We implement our protocol and provide comparative benchmarks to the Harrison and Haines solution. Our approach significantly outperforms the latter, allowing processing a considerably larger number of votes within the same hardware limits.