This chapter examines the complex relationship between federalism and digitalization in India focusing on how constitutional arrangement and institutional mechanisms shape the country's evolving digital governance landscape. The chapter explores whether India's federal system acts as a facilitator or a barrier to digital governance. In doing so, the chapter outlines constitutional distribution of powers between the central and state governments and explains how cooperative, competitive and conflicting phases of federalism have influenced governance in the digital domain in India. The chapter presents case studies from Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Tripura demonstrating how subnational governments have used centralized platforms to design localized solutions. It also examines how cooperative mechanisms—such as public private partnership and cross jurisdictional cooperation during the COVID-19 Pandemic—illustrate the adaptive capacity of India’s federal system. Overall, the chapter show that India’s federal architecture balances centralized tendency with decentralized flexibility that remain crucial for building an equitable and resilient digital governance system. 

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Digitalization in the Indian Federal System

  • Vikas Choudhary,
  • Ashish Abrol

摘要

This chapter examines the complex relationship between federalism and digitalization in India focusing on how constitutional arrangement and institutional mechanisms shape the country's evolving digital governance landscape. The chapter explores whether India's federal system acts as a facilitator or a barrier to digital governance. In doing so, the chapter outlines constitutional distribution of powers between the central and state governments and explains how cooperative, competitive and conflicting phases of federalism have influenced governance in the digital domain in India. The chapter presents case studies from Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Tripura demonstrating how subnational governments have used centralized platforms to design localized solutions. It also examines how cooperative mechanisms—such as public private partnership and cross jurisdictional cooperation during the COVID-19 Pandemic—illustrate the adaptive capacity of India’s federal system. Overall, the chapter show that India’s federal architecture balances centralized tendency with decentralized flexibility that remain crucial for building an equitable and resilient digital governance system.