In this chapter, we examine the specific features of Russia’s policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, while setting the stage for understanding the developments of 2022–2024. Sub-Saharan Africa serves as the focal point of this analysis, having gradually emerged as a key target of Russian foreign policy initiatives. This strategic shift has been largely shaped by the Kremlin’s global geopolitical calculations and its increasingly pronounced anti-Western orientation. At the same time, awareness of the strategic significance of Sub-Saharan Africa has grown both within the Russian business community and among the country’s political elites. It is no secret that the region possesses vast reserves of natural resources. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) alone accounts for approximately two-thirds of Africa’s mineral exports by value (Project IQ, 2024). Major mining economies in the region include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to several of the continent’s leading oil producers, including Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, South Sudan, and Chad. Sub-Saharan countries are also rich in critical raw materials, particularly the so-called low-carbon metals that are essential for energy transition technologies—such as cobalt, bauxite, and chromium. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar together account for approximately 50% of global cobalt reserves; Guinea holds around 24% of the world’s bauxite reserves; and South Africa is home to roughly 36% of the planet’s known chromium deposits (Andreoni & Avenyob, 2023: 69).