The chapter compares the two threats that are faced by prime ministers. On the one hand, the control by voters of their performance in office. On the other hand, threats to their survival in office posed by ambitious politicians from their own party or from other parties of the ruling coalition. About 54% of replacements of prime ministers in 23 parliamentary democracies, with 1,109 country-year observations, were not due to the verdict of citizens but to internal political intrigues. The cases of Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Willy Brandt in the German Federal Republic, Adolfo Suárez in Spain, Pierre Mendès-France in France, or Bettino Craxi in Italy are a few examples. Are the criteria of conspiring politicians similar to those of voters when prime ministers are replaced? When the economy grows and conditions are good, the risk of losing office due to an electoral defeat diminishes. On the contrary, the risks of being replaced by a politician from the same party or from the ruling coalition augments. What is the influence of ideology in the interpretation of the material conditions and the verdict on incumbent prime ministers?