Ever since the introduction of encryption, society has been divided over whether the government (or law enforcement agencies) should have the capability to decrypt private messages (with or without a warrant) of its citizens. From a technical viewpoint, the folklore belief is that semantic security always enables some form of steganography. Thus, adding backdoors to semantically secure schemes is pointless: it only weakens the security of the “good guys”, while “bad guys” can easily circumvent censorship, even if forced to hand over their decryption keys. In this paper, we put a dent in this folklore. We formalize three worlds: Dictatoria (“dictator wins”: no convenient steganography, no user cooperation needed), Warrantland (“checks-and-balances”: no convenient steganography, but need user’s cooperation), and Privatopia (“privacy wins”: built-in, high-rate steganography, even if giving away the decryption key). We give strong evidence that all these worlds are possible, thus reopening the encryption debate on a technical level. Our main novelty is the definition and design of special encryption schemes we call anamorphic-resistant (AR). In contrast to so-called “anamorphic schemes”,—which were studied in the literature and form the basis of Privatopia,—any attempt to steganographically communicate over an AR-encryption scheme will be either impossible or hugely slow (depending on the definitional details).