This chapter deals with the strengthening of the EU fiscal regulation paradigm during the euro crisis, which showed that the 2005 reformed Stability and Growth Pact had failed to promote sound budgetary policies. The euro crisis was interpreted as an asymmetrical crisis (hitting only those countries that had “misbehaved” from a fiscal point of view) with some specific culprits, the governments of some Southern European countries. When Greece nearly became unable to finance itself on the markets, Germany and France agreed on the strategies to react to the crisis. The main anti-crisis measures (Six Pack, Fiscal Compact, and Two Pack) made the EUfiscal regulation paradigm stricter than ever. New fiscal ideas found their way into that paradigm: stringency, epitomised by new sanctions, automaticity, as shown by the reverse qualified majority voting, and by the Council’s expectation to follow the recommendation of the Commission or to explain its position publicly. The attempt to limit the discretion of the Commission and the Council was the lowest common denominator of the measures. Other prominent fiscal ideas were treaty change, constitutionalisation, and European judicialisation. Not only the member states, but also the EU institutions became subject to a new set of obligations.