This chapter explores libertarian paternalism (LP), a framework that seeks to harmonize individual freedom with behavioral guidance aimed at enhancing wellbeing. At its core lies a specific form of paternalism—one that influences decision-making without restricting choice. This approach subtly steers individuals toward welfare-enhancing outcomes while upholding their autonomy. It is carefully balanced by a libertarian commitment to non-coercion and the preservation of freedom of choice. The theoretical underpinnings of LP are grounded in behavioral economics (BE), which critiques the classical notion of the fully rational actor. BE offers a descriptive model of how people actually behave, emphasizing the role of bounded rationality and highlighting the dual-system scheme of cognition and their roles—S1 as the default system and S2 as the on-demand system. This perspective exposes systematic patterns of cognitive failures leading to decision-making errors. While BE challenges the ideal of perfect rationality, it still uses it as a normative reference point. Consequently, remnants of the rational actor model persist within BE and LP. This can be attested in their treatment of motivation as both emphasize self-interested drivers of behavior, leaving other-regarding motivations relatively underexplored.

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Libertarian Paternalism

  • Pablo Garcés-Velástegui

摘要

This chapter explores libertarian paternalism (LP), a framework that seeks to harmonize individual freedom with behavioral guidance aimed at enhancing wellbeing. At its core lies a specific form of paternalism—one that influences decision-making without restricting choice. This approach subtly steers individuals toward welfare-enhancing outcomes while upholding their autonomy. It is carefully balanced by a libertarian commitment to non-coercion and the preservation of freedom of choice. The theoretical underpinnings of LP are grounded in behavioral economics (BE), which critiques the classical notion of the fully rational actor. BE offers a descriptive model of how people actually behave, emphasizing the role of bounded rationality and highlighting the dual-system scheme of cognition and their roles—S1 as the default system and S2 as the on-demand system. This perspective exposes systematic patterns of cognitive failures leading to decision-making errors. While BE challenges the ideal of perfect rationality, it still uses it as a normative reference point. Consequently, remnants of the rational actor model persist within BE and LP. This can be attested in their treatment of motivation as both emphasize self-interested drivers of behavior, leaving other-regarding motivations relatively underexplored.