Our disks and USB flash drives often store sensitive information, making them vulnerable to coercive adversaries, such as oppressive regimes, who can force users to disclose encryption keys. Traditional disk encryption methods are insufficient in such scenarios. Plausible deniability encryption addresses this issue by allowing users to convincingly deny the existence of specific private data on their storage devices. A notable example is the now defunct TrueCrypt [1], which effectively resists single-snapshot adversaries, those who can access the storage device only once. In academic research, methods like HIVE and DataLair have been proposed to counter multi-snapshot adversaries, who can access the device multiple times, by leveraging ORAM constructions. However, these approaches impose significant limitations on the usable storage space. To address these challenges, we propose RCE-HVE, a comprehensive optimization of the HIVE method that enhances both performance and storage efficiency. Compared to existing solutions, RCE-HVE is more concise, efficient, and provides substantially larger usable storage space.