Chapter 6 extends the core model of Chap. 5 to account for bank capital regulation and to study once again the performance of monetary and macroprudential policy rules independently, as well as interactions between these policies. Strategic interactions between policymakers are also considered: The solution under cooperation is compared to the solution obtained under the Nash equilibrium.

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Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

  • Pierre-Richard Agénor

摘要

Chapter 6 extends the core model of Chap. 5 to account for bank capital regulation and to study once again the performance of monetary and macroprudential policy rules independently, as well as interactions between these policies. Strategic interactions between policymakers are also considered: The solution under cooperation is compared to the solution obtained under the Nash equilibrium.