The Russo-Ukrainian war has one noteworthy detail—the Kremlin’s appeal to history and so-called historical justice to explain its actions. Considering such a notable “historical” background of modern Russian geopolitics, the author of this article considered the use of history in three aspects: (1) the ideology of the modern Russian regime; (2) the interpretation of Ukraine and Ukrainian statehood; (3) the general directions of historical policy in the temporarily occupied territories. The author refers to securitisation theory to explain and conceptualise the algorithm by which the Kremlin’s version of history is securitised and subsequently used by Russian Federation to justify the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian model of memory securitisation exhibits several distinct features. First, within this framework, Ukraine’s politics of history—including decommunisation and reinterpretation of the Soviet legacy—is consistently framed as a security threat aimed at undermining “historical unity” of Russians and Ukrainians and discrediting the shared past. Second, it entails the production of legitimacy—aggression is presented as a necessary act of self-defence and a means of protecting “historical justice”, while “historical arguments” are employed via propaganda to replace the principles of international law. Third, it involves identity construction—the narrative of “unity” between Russians and Ukrainians is used to justify the imposition of Russian identity on occupied Ukrainian territories. Thus, what unfolds is not only a physical occupation but also a cultural and symbolic one.

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Does History Matter? Historical Politics, Narratives and the Securitisation of Memory in the Russo-Ukrainian War

  • Sergii Pakhomenko

摘要

The Russo-Ukrainian war has one noteworthy detail—the Kremlin’s appeal to history and so-called historical justice to explain its actions. Considering such a notable “historical” background of modern Russian geopolitics, the author of this article considered the use of history in three aspects: (1) the ideology of the modern Russian regime; (2) the interpretation of Ukraine and Ukrainian statehood; (3) the general directions of historical policy in the temporarily occupied territories. The author refers to securitisation theory to explain and conceptualise the algorithm by which the Kremlin’s version of history is securitised and subsequently used by Russian Federation to justify the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian model of memory securitisation exhibits several distinct features. First, within this framework, Ukraine’s politics of history—including decommunisation and reinterpretation of the Soviet legacy—is consistently framed as a security threat aimed at undermining “historical unity” of Russians and Ukrainians and discrediting the shared past. Second, it entails the production of legitimacy—aggression is presented as a necessary act of self-defence and a means of protecting “historical justice”, while “historical arguments” are employed via propaganda to replace the principles of international law. Third, it involves identity construction—the narrative of “unity” between Russians and Ukrainians is used to justify the imposition of Russian identity on occupied Ukrainian territories. Thus, what unfolds is not only a physical occupation but also a cultural and symbolic one.