This chapter analyzes the British strategic approach toward Cyprus during the mid-1950s, focusing on Governor John Harding’s plan amid rising Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination. It situates the Harding Plan within the broader framework of British imperial interests, highlighting Cyprus’s role as a strategic military and intelligence hub during the Cold War. Britain’s proposal of limited self-government—while retaining control over security and foreign affairs—sought to neutralize the Enosis movement and preserve hegemonic dominance under the pretense of constitutional reform. The failure of the Harding–Makarios negotiations is examined not merely as a local or colonial dispute, but as a product of international systemic pressures. British unwillingness to concede real power, the exile of Archbishop Makarios, and the broader geopolitical instability in the Middle East—especially the decline of British influence in Aden, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—played a decisive role. American and Turkish alignment with British objectives further marginalized Greek Cypriot claims. The creation of a Turkish Cypriot auxiliary police force deepened communal divisions. The chapter argues that the Harding Plan was not a missed opportunity for peace, but a deliberate attempt to militarize and securitize Cyprus in service of British and Western Cold War interests.