Rule of law and judicial independence can be influenced and shaped by internal and external factors, not least international development activities. Arguably a focus of many ‘western’ states in their development work, securing written constitutional guarantees (de jure independence), overlooks the role of pre-existing local cultural approaches and practices which may preclude such de jure independence translating into practice, de facto independence. Other development partners a state may choose to work with may be less interested in constitutional development or democracy strengthening activities. This chapter draws on a range of extant literature, including work on the role of courts and judicial independence in debates on rule of law v rule by law, judicialization of politics v politicisation of the judiciary and the difference between de jure judicial independence (a central goal of international organisation and bilateral ‘western’ development) and de facto independence. Cambodia is drawn on as a case study, with its recent evolution from a much-celebrated new democracy to a de facto one-party authoritarian, autocratic state considered, with reference to influential states supporting Cambodia’s development. Understanding the potential impact of external development influences on evolving judicial independence in fragile democracies offers insights into (unintended?) consequences of some international development approaches, suggesting a need for more focussed technical assistance partnerships.