Judicial developments in Pakistan between 2005 and 2013 and in Egypt between 1979 and 2001 suggest that judicial populism, manifested in the contestation between heterogeneous groups of society (such as civil society organizations, lawyers, and opposition political parties) and ruling elites, alongside the emergence of active and strategic judicial leadership shaped the context in which judicial independence increased. These groups expressed their contestation through anti-regime and pro-judges demonstrations and anti-regime litigation. These actions signaled the emergence of judicial populism and provided the judiciary with protection against state-led court-packing and court-curbing measures, while also enabling an increase in rulings issued against government interests in both countries. How and why does judicial populism shape the context in which judicial independence increases in developing democracies? Little is written about judicial populism, and studies touching upon this subject do not adequately examine the relationship between judicial independence and judicial populism, especially in developing democracies. These studies suggest that judicial populism undermines certain aspects of judicial independence. Comparing Egypt and Pakistan, this chapter argues that judicial populism consists of the contestation between ruling elites and people and the emergence of active and strategic judicial leadership that leverages this contestation to advance judicial independence. These features of judicial populism shaped the context in which the judiciary increased its power against other branches of state between 2005 and 2013 in Pakistan, and between 1979 and 2001 in Egypt. When these elements ceased to exist, judicial independence could not be maintained. This chapter provides the first interdisciplinary comparative analysisof judicial populism and judicial independence in Pakistan and Egypt. It advances the study of judicial independence and judicial populism by offering the insight that judicial populism can strengthen judicial independence only when two conditions coexist: sustained contestation between the people and ruling elites, and a strategic judicial leader able to leverage that contestation to enhance judicial independence.