In this chapter I explain, and offer a detailed defence of, the general picture of naturalised metaphysics and epistemic stances I briefly sketched in the Introduction. I clarify the distinction between explicit and implicit entities of science, and argue that naturalised metaphysics is defined as much by the methodology used as by the kind of entities invoked. I say more about my taxonomy of four epistemic stances of increasing strength, and discuss the different permissions and prohibitions with respect to ontological beliefs that are associated with each stance, clarifying what is meant by ‘permissions and prohibitions’ in this context. I go on to discuss and defend voluntarism with respect to stance choice, by considering and responding to some recent objections. I discuss prominent recent work on naturalised metaphysics, and compare it with the stance-approach I am taking, and I look specifically at the question of naturalised metaphysics of biology, a topic that has been relatively neglected in recent discussions. Finally, I address the question of whether the value-ladenness of an epistemic stance means that stance choice cannot be rationally justified, and there cannot be rational debate concerning which stances to adopt.