The final set of metaphysical issues that I will argue can be fruitfully understood in terms of the metaphysical stance framework are those relating to holism and reductionism. My argument for construing holism and reductionism as metaphysical stances proceeds from the observation that pluralism is the appropriate position to take with respect to reductionist and holist explanations: reductionism is true of some systems, while holism is true of others. This undermines both holism and reductionism understood as general factual claims about nature. Thus, if there are interesting and important general reductionist and holist positions, which I believe there are, these cannot be broad factual claims or hypotheses about nature, but must rather be metaphysical stances. In this chapter I also discuss a particular form of holism, dialectics. This is the Hegelian-Marxian doctrine, roughly, that reality is a differentiated totality in which the totality is in some sense primary (the whole is prior to the parts), that change is a constant and pervasive feature of reality, and that change takes place as the result of conflict and contradiction. It can, I argue, be interpreted as a metaphysical stance—a way of seeing the world or style of thinking—that may influences the practice of science in certain characteristic ways, and may thereby be pragmatically justified.