This chapter explores the complex devolution dynamics in Zimbabwe. Devolution has been a politically and economically sensitive topic in Zimbabwe for over four decades due to certain historical experiences such as pre- and post-colonial philosophies around Marxism–Leninism, Communism and Capitalism. Tribal conflicts also influenced devolution approaches. Some schools of thought posited a staggered economic devolution from central to local governments, whilst other schools argued that you cannot have economic devolution and development without political devolution. The various theories of decentralisation and devolution are explored in the chapter, including empirical experiences up to 2013, when a new Constitution was enacted. National budget allocations towards devolution are also discussed, with empirical evidence pointing towards the view that they are not only insufficient but also marred by late disbursements and utilisation unrelated to the Constitutional aspirations. The chapter concludes by providing some feasible ways forward such as increasing allocations towards the devolution fund, early disbursements, increased transparency and accountability mechanisms and increased operational autonomy of local authorities.

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Devolution and the Public Finance Management Framework in Zimbabwe

  • Michael Takudzwa Pasara

摘要

This chapter explores the complex devolution dynamics in Zimbabwe. Devolution has been a politically and economically sensitive topic in Zimbabwe for over four decades due to certain historical experiences such as pre- and post-colonial philosophies around Marxism–Leninism, Communism and Capitalism. Tribal conflicts also influenced devolution approaches. Some schools of thought posited a staggered economic devolution from central to local governments, whilst other schools argued that you cannot have economic devolution and development without political devolution. The various theories of decentralisation and devolution are explored in the chapter, including empirical experiences up to 2013, when a new Constitution was enacted. National budget allocations towards devolution are also discussed, with empirical evidence pointing towards the view that they are not only insufficient but also marred by late disbursements and utilisation unrelated to the Constitutional aspirations. The chapter concludes by providing some feasible ways forward such as increasing allocations towards the devolution fund, early disbursements, increased transparency and accountability mechanisms and increased operational autonomy of local authorities.