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Electronic voting is a wicked problem: voters must only vote once, voting must be auditable, and votes must be permanently preserved—but they must also be anonymous. We examine the source code of a paperless Direct Recording Electronic voting system and find serious integrity and privacy issues. Those issues were reported to the relevant authorities and patched, but the underlying design issues remain.

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Security Analysis of the Australian Capital Territory’s eVACS 2020/2024 Paperless Direct Recording Electronic Voting System

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Chris Culnane,
  • Andrew Conway,
  • Vanessa Teague,
  • Ty Wilson-Brown

摘要

Electronic voting is a wicked problem: voters must only vote once, voting must be auditable, and votes must be permanently preserved—but they must also be anonymous. We examine the source code of a paperless Direct Recording Electronic voting system and find serious integrity and privacy issues. Those issues were reported to the relevant authorities and patched, but the underlying design issues remain.