This chapter delves into the thought of Friedrich Meinecke, who can be seen as a representative of a kind of “old guard” in historiographical thinking. In this capacity, his struggle to reconcile himself to a shifting epistemic landscape characterized by new and irreducible uncertainties illustrates the degree to which these shifts were indeed inescapable, something that an analysis of a more radically inclined intellect might not. For this reason, this chapter delves deeply into a close reading of his 1924 text Die Idee der Staatsräson, which allows us to unpack in granular detail the various sticking-points in Meinecke’s self-reflexive attempt to reconcile his accustomed method of political-historical analysis with evolving epistemological considerations, against habit and predilection but in response to a perceived existential necessity. As Meinecke argues, while the concept of raison d’état might appear to offer a bridge between the realms of pure power and pure ethical value, instead—in times of acute uncertainty such as his own—conceptual tension between these realms causes the bridge to collapse, drawing state and society down with it into a vortex of cumulative escalation and destruction. And yet, in making the decision to face an irreconcilable dualism rather than attempt an artificial reduction, Meinecke holds onto the hope that responsible statecraft may yet be possible.

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A Stroll in the Engulfing Maze

  • Michael Dylan Rogers

摘要

This chapter delves into the thought of Friedrich Meinecke, who can be seen as a representative of a kind of “old guard” in historiographical thinking. In this capacity, his struggle to reconcile himself to a shifting epistemic landscape characterized by new and irreducible uncertainties illustrates the degree to which these shifts were indeed inescapable, something that an analysis of a more radically inclined intellect might not. For this reason, this chapter delves deeply into a close reading of his 1924 text Die Idee der Staatsräson, which allows us to unpack in granular detail the various sticking-points in Meinecke’s self-reflexive attempt to reconcile his accustomed method of political-historical analysis with evolving epistemological considerations, against habit and predilection but in response to a perceived existential necessity. As Meinecke argues, while the concept of raison d’état might appear to offer a bridge between the realms of pure power and pure ethical value, instead—in times of acute uncertainty such as his own—conceptual tension between these realms causes the bridge to collapse, drawing state and society down with it into a vortex of cumulative escalation and destruction. And yet, in making the decision to face an irreconcilable dualism rather than attempt an artificial reduction, Meinecke holds onto the hope that responsible statecraft may yet be possible.