Given Carnap’s view according to which many philosophical problems are merely pseudo-problems, the question about how to choose between competing philosophical theories becomes the question of choosing between different linguistic frameworks. In this essay, I focus on meta-theoretical criteria which we might want to use to evaluate and select philosophical theories—namely, their theoretical virtues. I take as an example a typical case of a metaphysical debate where a sort of a dead-end has been reached, namely the debate concerning Trope Theory, the Theory of Universals, and Nominalism. I examine how these rival views address the problem of ‘attribute agreement’—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place—and I show that there is not much of a difference between the ways these theories handle it. In a more general way I then argue that there is little reason for preferring one theory over the other. To do this, I examine several meta-theoretical criteria for the evaluation of theories such as explanatory power, simplicity, compatibility with current science, and others, focusing on the role that primitives play in metaphysical theories.