Several disagreements between Carnap and Quine remain live: Descendant positions resembling the opposing stances that Carnap and Quine took on several issues are still debated. One dispute is over ontological disagreement. Positions like those of Carnap and Quine’s are playing out in the quantifier-variance literature. The disagreement over analyticity also remains live. The historical point made in this paper: The real dispute between Carnap and Quine is about how artificial languages are to be deployed to facilitate doing mathematics and science: How are the resources of artificial languages to replace/supplement/replicate what we “pre-formally” use when doing science and mathematics in natural languages? By calling this disagreement between them “the real dispute,” what is indicated is that Carnap and Quine’s respective positions on the other more publicized issues follow from their differing views about the relationships between artificial and natural languages. Neither philosopher had the resources to resolve this question definitively. We still can’t because of certain logical/empirical complexities the issue raises, and that are described in the paper.