The decisive feature of Classical Virtue Ethics as found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is that morally right action is finally determined neither by following moral rules nor in achieving desired consequences but rather by the very decision of the virtuous man (ho spoudaios) himself who acts according to his nature as virtuous. The decisive significance of the nature of the moral agent in determining moral rightness in action is the distinctive feature of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and this feature is also found in the natural virtue of the sage in the Laozi. By comparing the virtuous man as described by Aristotle in his NE with the description of the sage (sheng ren) in the Laozi, I defend the thesis that the Laozi can be read as a moral philosophy, and specifically a virtue ethics in its presentation of the virtue of the sage in non-action. In effect, the article argues that the Laozi presents a unique virtue ethics – a daoist virtue ethics comparable to the classical virtue ethics of Aristotle as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.