Transhumanism and posthumanism are nowadays challenging the normative standing of the ‘human’, albeit from opposing directions. Taken together, they are dislodging the equation of ‘human being = Homo sapiens’ that was first forged by Carolus Linnaeus in the mid-eighteenth century. This chapter considers the stakes in what I regard as a world-historic ‘transvaluation’ of the concept of humanity in the face of competing pressures from, so to speak, ultrahuman machines and infrahuman nature. The chapter begins by revisiting the original context in which Michel Foucault presented the ‘Death of Man’ thesis in the 1960s, including its Nietzschean heritage. This line of thought is extended into the contemporary period, in which we are increasingly forced to judge what is worth preserving of the ‘human’, as well as where and how it should be preserved. In many respects, this radical repositioning of the value of the human returns us to the problem of cosmic justice, or ‘theodicy’. Drawing on the work of Georg Simmel and Kurt Lewin, the chapter generally concludes that humanity should be regarded as a style of being in the world that may be subject to a variety of quite different material realizations.