Standard transhumanist appeals to enhancement and heritable transcendence are at odds with a transformative account of human development. For Soviet psychologist L.S. Vygotsky, the human is a product of social and artifactual mediation and, as such, is already a project of biological transcendence. The proper goal of collectivist politics, moreover, is to secure a transformation of human nature congruent with revolutionary freedom. This paper thus establishes Vygotsky’s transhumanism in light of his “genetic” psychology, which shows enhancement to be only one aspect of onto- and phylogenetic transformation. How this transformative potential coheres with Virtue Ethics depends on how a developmental methodology bears on the question of human essence. With this in mind, Vygotsky’s transhumanism is reconstructed in light of Aristotle’s moral perfectionism and the more recent Capabilities Approach, both of which offer an alternative to the utilitarianism so often found in transhumanist ethics. But to situate Vygotsky’s project within an ethics of human flourishing, one must overcome the eudaimonistic tendency to treat biological capacities as “fixed.” If the human is always already a biologically transcending entity—whose brain, moreover, is fundamentally plastic—then flourishing will know no such biological fixity.

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Revolution and Transformation: Vygotsky, Eudaimonia, and the Social Essence of (Trans)human Development

  • Chris Drain

摘要

Standard transhumanist appeals to enhancement and heritable transcendence are at odds with a transformative account of human development. For Soviet psychologist L.S. Vygotsky, the human is a product of social and artifactual mediation and, as such, is already a project of biological transcendence. The proper goal of collectivist politics, moreover, is to secure a transformation of human nature congruent with revolutionary freedom. This paper thus establishes Vygotsky’s transhumanism in light of his “genetic” psychology, which shows enhancement to be only one aspect of onto- and phylogenetic transformation. How this transformative potential coheres with Virtue Ethics depends on how a developmental methodology bears on the question of human essence. With this in mind, Vygotsky’s transhumanism is reconstructed in light of Aristotle’s moral perfectionism and the more recent Capabilities Approach, both of which offer an alternative to the utilitarianism so often found in transhumanist ethics. But to situate Vygotsky’s project within an ethics of human flourishing, one must overcome the eudaimonistic tendency to treat biological capacities as “fixed.” If the human is always already a biologically transcending entity—whose brain, moreover, is fundamentally plastic—then flourishing will know no such biological fixity.