The concluding chapter outlines the proposed alternative model of supermajority law, which might be worthy of consideration for future constitution-making processes. This framework relies on three main components. Firstly, the constitution is supposed to provide expressly for supermajority as a separate category of legal norms, and its legal rank should be specified under the constitution, but above ordinary laws. This would mean that supermajority laws would be strictly separated from both the constitutional provisions and the ordinary statutory rules. This model would not only ensure the coherence of the constitution but also the prevalence of supermajority laws over ordinary laws in cases of contradictions. Secondly, an absolute parliamentary majority would be required for the enactment or amendment of supermajority laws. Apart from this, as part of the revamped supermajority legislative process, a separate parliamentary commission would be set up to hear exclusively supermajority laws. As a last procedural element, the constitutional court would mandatorily rule on the constitutionality of the enacted supermajority law before its promulgation, within a constitutionally provided short deadline. A narrow circle of constitutional actors could also submit their opinions to the constitutional court. Thirdly, supermajority law would cover just the status, organization, and competence of seven to eight key constitutional actors; therefore, its scope of applicability would be significantly narrowed. This proposed model of supermajority law should obviously be adapted to the individual circumstances of each country; however, it may serve as a point of reference for the drafters of any constitutional amendment wherever a certain form of supermajority law has already been implemented.