After having carefully considered the five main potential justificative arguments behind supermajority law, this chapter conceptualizes the main directions for looking for alternative models of this constitutional tool. The chapter refers back to the three distinctive features of supermajority law and focuses on its legal rank, its special procedural rules, and its scope of application. Firstly, the uncertainties around the legal rank of supermajority law are highlighted, and the need for clarifying its position within the hierarchy of norms is underlined. Moreover, supermajority and ordinary legislative provisions should be clearly separated; neither act should contain provisions from both categories. Secondly, the main components of the revamped supermajority legislative procedure are sought. For this reason, the chapter considers the possibility of establishing a separate parliamentary commission dealing exclusively with supermajority laws, and also potentially determining the minimum time limit to be allocated for the parliamentary debate of each supermajority bill. The stronger demand for social participation might also distinguish supermajority and ordinary legislative processes: meaningful social consultations might be required before the parliamentary enactment of any supermajority law. Besides this, mandatory prior constitutional review of supermajority laws to be conducted by the constitutional court may confer an additional safeguard on the constitutionality of supermajority laws. Thirdly, the scope of supermajority law might be narrowed: it could cover the status, organization, and competences of the key institutions of the state; fundamental rights could be protected through the safeguarding of these constitutional actors.