Supermajority Laws as Instruments to Construct Political Compromise
摘要
Depending on the exact procedural rules of the supermajority legislative process, the implementation of supermajority law will considerably influence the political discourse. This impact is understood more deeply through the analysis of four paramount issues. Firstly, supermajority law is considered from the perspective of different political actors. One would conclude that strong political parties, either on the governmental or the oppositional side, will favor this legal instrument because the broad consent requirement would centralize the political spectrum dominated by two or three influential political parties. By contrast, the elevated majority would reduce the influence of smaller political formations on the decision-making process. Secondly, the interdependence between the supermajority law concept and the electoral system should be taken into account. If the electoral system operates mainly on the majoritarian principle, political parties with meaningful support would have a greater chance of gaining a parliamentary supermajority, while the proportional electoral framework would produce a controversial effect. Thirdly, if a vote of confidence could also be attached to the votes on supermajority bills, the parliament would have more opportunities to dismiss the government if its parliamentary trust has decreased. Fourthly, supermajority law imposes additional difficulties on minority governments: without astable parliamentary majority, it would be almost impossible to secure supermajority support for governmental bills. As a consequence, minority governments would almost disappear from countries operating with supermajority. These considerations will be relevant for each form of supermajority law; however, the stricter form of supermajority stipulated by the constitution would have a stronger political impact.