This chapter conceptualizes how supermajority laws could be seen as quasi-constitutional norms, which confer almost the same protection on these laws as on the constitution itself. Certain potential benefits are also mentioned; however, the envisaged disadvantages urge an exact constitutional orientation on the legal rank of supermajority law. The expansion of the constitution undermines its unique and coherent character as the supreme norm at the top of the whole legal pyramid. Whether the formal or the substantial aspects of this coherence are investigated, both could be undermined if a clear distinction is not established between the constitution and supermajority laws. Supermajority laws with quasi-constitutional character could even contradict the constitution, which could considerably reduce constitutional authority. The other side of this coin requires a strong differentiation between supermajority and ordinary laws, which has been consistently rejected by several constitutional courts and academic scholars. On the contrary, I argue for the necessity of a clear hierarchy between supermajority and ordinary laws to avoid confusion between the supermajority and the ordinary legislative process. With this step, the confusion of supermajority and ordinary statutory provisions within the same law would cease; the task of the constitutional courts would be facilitated in providing the same level of constitutional protection for both the supermajority and ordinary legislative domains. The arguments presented in Chap. 3 , along with those detailed in Chap. 4 , lead to the proposed constitutional clarification of supermajority’s legal rank to be proposed in Chap. 9 . According to my proposal, supermajority would appear as a separate category of legal sources within the constitution, and its position would be clearly placed under the constitution but above ordinary laws in this revamped model.