The purpose of this work is to highlight some fundamental aspects of the imaginative apprehension in Husserlian phenomenology. Moving from perception, we will show that every apprehension begins with a stimulus that comes from the thing. We will clarify that this activity of the thing offers to consciousness the presentation of a precise content: the essence of the thing itself. Consciousness, in turn, “impressed” by such a content, reacts by registering it (first perception) and thus creating a flow of lived experiences (Erlebnisse or second perception). To this act of presentation by the thing follows an act of presentification by the consciousness. Through imagination, the image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) fulfils (erfüllt) the adumbraments (Abschattungen), which the presentation brings with itself. Finally, with the act of retention, the identity-consciousness reaches its perfection in the objective presentification through the imaginative act.