In the following insight will be provided into Wittgenstein’s extremely complex theory of calculus and room shall be provided for his concept of local calculus throughout the Nineteen-Thirties, most notably across The Big Typescript. The thesis is that, since language, as well as every other human activity, is multi-layered, it makes no sense to posit one basic hermeneutical level as the starting point/surface for every—given?—language game. A number of noteworthy paradoxes inside the The Big Typescript and across Wittgenstein’s later work are considered in order to demonstrate our thesis. In addition, we focus on the Part Two of Philosophical Investigations and notably on the paradoxical character of both seeing-as and meaning and expression as symptoms of one’s situating oneself within the ever-practised human forms of life. Three major paradoxes arise: a (partial) incompatibility paradox, an obiedience paradox and lastly a suspension paradox. We therefore arrive at a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work that understands it as an ontopoietic one, since language games are always capable to restructure themselves, based on the—ultimately unfathomable—ability of certain prestigiously marked players.