The following paper will examine the account of sensations in their givenness inasmuch as these come to light as qualitative properties and therefore “independent parts”. This will be done in order to identify a genetic and near-phenomenological aspect of “hypothetical components” of sensations in their givenness. Our main focus shall be the treatments Heymann Steinthal gave of such topics in the light of his criticism of other such treatments provided by colleague philosophers and researchers such as linguists and empirical proto-psychologists, amongst whom Karl Heyse, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Lange, Moritz Lazarus, Hermann Lotze, Max Müller, August Schleicher, Carl Stumpf. Room will also be given to the fruiful Steinthal-Cassirer relationship within the wide and rich framework of Neo-Kantianism. The main aim is to identify a genetic and near-phenomenological aspect of “hypothetical components” of sensations. The article shall firstly stress the fundamental link between this issue and the relational system of intellectual functions or “complexes” according to the “speculative psychology” present via Lotze in Alexius Meinong. Along such lines the treatment is to present what is Kantianly known as “reflective judgements” in the light of a material ontology enabling an attempt to define the core for an ontology of values. These, in turn, are to be proved transcendental within the prospect of an investigation of existential-adaptive aptitudes of our species.