Hume, a secular realist, created a simple philosophic fiction to engage his readers in thinking ethically about the survival behavior of an imaginary subject who found himself in an extreme situation controlled by a “society of ruffians remote from the protection of laws and government.” After asking pointedly, “What conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation?”, Hume offered his readers an invitation to life, arguing in favor of his imaginary subject’s use of violence to secure self-preservation in a lawless environment in which justice is suspended. Given Hume’s sentimentalist view that human beings are naturally endowed with humanity or a fellow-feeling with others, his primary focus on self-preservation is questioned to see whether care and concern for others is an equal partner in a potentially conflictive ethical drama of self and others. Addressing this drama directly, the author focuses critically on the work of (a) humanitarian scholars (outsiders), who argued that dignity and a moral compass are maintained in extremity, and (b) the confessions of former captives (insiders), who argued that the German concentration camp, for example, was a savage environment in which cognitively and emotionally regressed captives, struggling for survival against the odds, emulated the barbaric behavior of their captors, thereby reinforcing Hume’s dark vision of the natural depravity of humankind. Mindful of the messy business of ethics and the emotionally charged subject at hand, the author cautions readers by addressing Hume’s inflammatory argument that, “the ultimate ends of human actions can never, … be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.” Updating Hume’s argument, neuroscientific research is introduced to show that moral judgments are more likely to involve emotion (affect-laden intuitions) than deliberate reasoning.

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Hume: An Invitation to Life

  • Carl P. Ellerman

摘要

Hume, a secular realist, created a simple philosophic fiction to engage his readers in thinking ethically about the survival behavior of an imaginary subject who found himself in an extreme situation controlled by a “society of ruffians remote from the protection of laws and government.” After asking pointedly, “What conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation?”, Hume offered his readers an invitation to life, arguing in favor of his imaginary subject’s use of violence to secure self-preservation in a lawless environment in which justice is suspended. Given Hume’s sentimentalist view that human beings are naturally endowed with humanity or a fellow-feeling with others, his primary focus on self-preservation is questioned to see whether care and concern for others is an equal partner in a potentially conflictive ethical drama of self and others. Addressing this drama directly, the author focuses critically on the work of (a) humanitarian scholars (outsiders), who argued that dignity and a moral compass are maintained in extremity, and (b) the confessions of former captives (insiders), who argued that the German concentration camp, for example, was a savage environment in which cognitively and emotionally regressed captives, struggling for survival against the odds, emulated the barbaric behavior of their captors, thereby reinforcing Hume’s dark vision of the natural depravity of humankind. Mindful of the messy business of ethics and the emotionally charged subject at hand, the author cautions readers by addressing Hume’s inflammatory argument that, “the ultimate ends of human actions can never, … be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.” Updating Hume’s argument, neuroscientific research is introduced to show that moral judgments are more likely to involve emotion (affect-laden intuitions) than deliberate reasoning.