In what follows, I deploy the results of my enquiry to achieve the second goal of the present book: Laying the groundwork for a new scientific realism that points to a way out of the double stalemate of OSR without falling into the pitfalls of systematic correlationism. This enables the development of innovative realist solutions in the metalocal realism-anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, thus answering the question of this study. In contrast to chapter 2, which consists in remapping a familiar territory - the realism-anti-realism debates of the last decades , my following remarks can instead be viewed more as a nautical chart drawn by observations made from a distance. Nevertheless, I do not want to imply by this that the following outlook is uncertain or random. Rather, the results of the small-step analyses of the arguments, theses and philosophical proposals can be used to take a final step towards the goal of the present study, to provide answers to the following questions: If everything relevant from the preceding study is taken into account, what variants of a new scientific realism (NSR) are then possible? Within what framework must any conceivable NSR orient itself? What are the key lessons from the failure of OSR and systematic correlationism, and how might different approaches lead to different types of NSR? Subchapter 8.1 addresses the question of the general framework for any NSR. To this end, the first section draws lessons from the double stalemate of OSR and the refutation of systematic correlationism (8.1.1), then presents ontological (8.1.2) and epistemological (8.1.3) grounding assumptions as well as challenges that every NSR will necessarily share. Subchapter 8.2 addresses one of two absolutely essential task of NSR: the development of a new philosophy of nature. This step is necessary to replace the untenable conceptions of a single real external world and a systematically correlated natural external world in the context of philosophy of science. I give an overview of the aspects that such a new philosophy of nature can take into account and I draw on (8.2.1), before discussing two key issues: the inherent plurality of the ontological domain of nature (8.2.2) and the possibilities in the theoretical landscape for local laws of nature and other core concerns (8.2.3). The final subchapter 8.3 discusses the ways in which we, our scientific practices, and the plural domains of nature are multiply connected. It considers what an epistemology of NSR might look like (8.3.1), how central the issues of scientific objectivity and critique of the natural sciences are anchored in NSR (8.3.2), and why a conception of scientific transdisciplinarity is recommended for any NSR (8.3.3).

Towards the New Scientific Realism

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发表日期：

2025年

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Jan Voosholz

摘要

In what follows, I deploy the results of my enquiry to achieve the second goal of the present book: Laying the groundwork for a new scientific realism that points to a way out of the double stalemate of OSR without falling into the pitfalls of systematic correlationism. This enables the development of innovative realist solutions in the metalocal realism-anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, thus answering the question of this study. In contrast to chapter 2, which consists in remapping a familiar territory - the realism-anti-realism debates of the last decades , my following remarks can instead be viewed more as a nautical chart drawn by observations made from a distance. Nevertheless, I do not want to imply by this that the following outlook is uncertain or random. Rather, the results of the small-step analyses of the arguments, theses and philosophical proposals can be used to take a final step towards the goal of the present study, to provide answers to the following questions: If everything relevant from the preceding study is taken into account, what variants of a new scientific realism (NSR) are then possible? Within what framework must any conceivable NSR orient itself? What are the key lessons from the failure of OSR and systematic correlationism, and how might different approaches lead to different types of NSR? Subchapter 8.1 addresses the question of the general framework for any NSR. To this end, the first section draws lessons from the double stalemate of OSR and the refutation of systematic correlationism (8.1.1), then presents ontological (8.1.2) and epistemological (8.1.3) grounding assumptions as well as challenges that every NSR will necessarily share. Subchapter 8.2 addresses one of two absolutely essential task of NSR: the development of a new philosophy of nature. This step is necessary to replace the untenable conceptions of a single real external world and a systematically correlated natural external world in the context of philosophy of science. I give an overview of the aspects that such a new philosophy of nature can take into account and I draw on (8.2.1), before discussing two key issues: the inherent plurality of the ontological domain of nature (8.2.2) and the possibilities in the theoretical landscape for local laws of nature and other core concerns (8.2.3). The final subchapter 8.3 discusses the ways in which we, our scientific practices, and the plural domains of nature are multiply connected. It considers what an epistemology of NSR might look like (8.3.1), how central the issues of scientific objectivity and critique of the natural sciences are anchored in NSR (8.3.2), and why a conception of scientific transdisciplinarity is recommended for any NSR (8.3.3).