In this fifth chapter, I will argue for the main thesis of the first part of this book, according to which objective scientific realism (OSR) is bound up in a double stalemate. First, I reconstruct the main arguments against OSR. This shows why three different families of neo- and anti-realist challanges, underdetermination arguments, historical arguments and anti-totality arguments, put OSR in irresolvable difficulties. I mainly refer to Chakravartty’s semirealism as a relevant, topical contribution to show how it fails despite its subtle construction. It also becomes obvious that the counter-arguments do not establish a better position in the form of an anti-realism in philosophy of science. This is the first stalemate between anti-realism and OSR in philosophy of science. Second, I show why the more recent solution of structural realism, which partly takes into account the basic constellation of the first stalemate, ends up repeating the manoeuvres of the original debate. Since what I will call antitotality arguments, which constitute one of the three central challenges to OSR are not fully comprehended, structural realism itself falls back into the patern of the first stalemate. I demonstrate this by reconstructing the argumentation of Steven French’s ontic structural realism and comparing it to Chakravartty’s semirealism. My analyses of Chakravartty’s attempt to justify OSR as well as French’s attempt to overcome it provide reasons why both are able to raise legitimate objections to each other without being able to refute the arguments against their own position. This demonstrates the second stalemate: That between subtle and structural realist OSR. Thus, I conclude by drawing a summary from the entirety of the first part of this book for the case of the metalocal debate in philosophy of science by arguing for the necessity of a New Realism in philosophy of science, a new scientific realism. In my view, this is the only way to resolve both stalemates.