Easy Ontology (EO), defended in several recent works by Amie Thomasson, and based on Carnap’s famous deflationism about metaphysics, is the view that many ontological questions, like ‘Are there numbers?’, are at bottom easy, at least when taken in their “internal” sense. Both Carnap and Thomasson take for granted that serious metaphysicians therefore cannot plausibly be interpreted as asking internal questions. Thus, they think they are committed to finding some alternative, special interpretation of metaphysicians’ utterances. I argue that none of the alternative interpretations proposed in the literature are viable. More importantly, I argue that Carnap and Thomasson are wrong about this commitment. EO should instead be coupled with the view that metaphysicians ask internal questions, yet have the false belief that they can be answered only through metaphysical speculation. This is a significant modification of EO, in which the notion of an “external question” plays no role, and which results in a simpler and more plausible theory. Carnap took for granted that metaphysicians cannot be asking internal questions, and claims instead that they use and understand ontological questions in a special, “external” sense, i.e., with a certain lexical meaning (1950/1956, pp. 209, 210, 213). As we will see, however, all extant proposals about this alleged, special sense are untenable. Fortunately for EO, there is no need to identify such a special sense: we can just take metaphysicians to (typically) use and understand ontological questions in their ordinary sense, which is their internal sense. This interpretation of metaphysicians is more charitable and yields a simpler and more innocuous version of EO—indeed, one which makes no use of the notion of an external question. This is a radical departure from the views of Carnap himself and his main contemporary follower, Amie Thomasson. It makes EO easier to state, understand, and defend.