Literal talk of possible worlds and similarity between them is thought to presuppose accepting substantive forms of realism about possible worlds. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims—i.e. claims of metaphysical necessity and possibility—are not descriptive claims reporting on possible worlds, primitive modal facts, or any kind of modal truth maker. Instead, the function of basic modal discourse is normative: basic modal claims express and endorse semantic rules governing the terms involved in those claims. Taking the two idea together, it might be thought that modal normativism should avoid literal talk about possible worlds or should accept a form of fictionalism about possible worlds. In this paper, I will argue that this is false: modal normativism can and ought to keep literal talk of possible worlds and similarity between them. I will show how literal talk of worlds quite naturally falls out the normativist’s characterization of the function of modal discourse. Moreover, I will show how literal talk of similarity between worlds naturally falls out of our practice of expressing semantic rules using counterfactual claims on the normativist account.