This paper defends the plausibility of antirealism about facts, and of fictionalism about ‘fact talk’. That is, it defends the view that even when a particular object o exemplifies a property P, there is no further entity to be identified with the fact that o is P; but also that it might be useful to engage in the pretense that there is such an entity. In order to defend antirealism about facts, two rival realist views are critically examined: the sort of explanatory realism that follows from Armstrong’s truthmaker argument for states of affairs, and the simple realism about facts that follows from the easy approach developed by Amie Thomasson in Ontology Made Easy and her previous work on existence questions. After offering a negative assessment of the arguments for realism, we offer some motivations for adopting a fictionalist view of fact talk, and consider how a fictionalist about facts could reply to one of Thomasson’s central objections to fictionalism, i.e. how to explain the difference between a (hypothetically successful) assertion that facts exist, and the mere pretense that facts exist.