Brentano wrote that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.” Does this mean that he thought philosophy ought to operate in the same way as the natural sciences? Does it mean that he took the laws of his descriptive psychology to describe natural features of consciousness? Would intentionality thus be a natural feature of the mind, in the way digestion is a natural feature of the body? This paper argues against such a view. It first discusses the nature of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which is said to be empirically based on inner perception. The laws of inner perception cannot be obtained by standard induction, since they are supposed to be exact (or strict) and exceptionless in the way mathematical theorems are. Inner perception is said to be evident in the sense that, in inner perception, experiences appear as they are. Even if this sort of evidence applies to each experience, it cannot serve as an inductive basis for the corresponding laws. How does Brentano move from the evidence delivered by each instance of inner perception to the exact laws of descriptive psychology? The paper argues that the laws of descriptive psychology are best understood as analytic statements, obtained through phenomenological analysis. Psychological concepts are analysed by inquiring into the way experiences appear in inner perception. Since experiences appear as they are, this sort of analysis reveals their nature. This, and not induction, grounds the claim that psychological laws are strict and exceptionless. Phenomenological analysis requires more than mere understanding: one must also be acquainted with the associated phenomena. Phenomenological analysis, contrary to the empiricist analysis of concepts, is not a priori. Brentano’s phenomenological analysis is compared with other forms of conceptual analysis. It is shown that it does not aim to deliver any form of metaphysical reduction (e.g., reducing all true statements to statements about experiences) or epistemological foundation (e.g., grounding all knowledge ultimately in inner perception). It is then shown how Brentano applies his methodology to intuitive judgements, as exemplified by formal axioms. The paper concludes with considerations on Brentano’s concept of truth, showing that his influential account of values (including truth) in terms of fitting response is a natural consequence of his general suggestion that central philosophical concepts—such as being, causality, and precisely truth—ought to be subjected to phenomenological analysis. This means that we must ask ourselves how truth appears to consciousness. Brentano thus questions the coherence of a concept of truth that could be applied without our understanding what it would take for it to be manifest in consciousness.

Is Intentionality a Natural Mark of the Mental? On Brentano’s Scientific Methodology

章节
发表日期：

2025年

查看全文

Gianfranco Soldati

摘要

Brentano wrote that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.” Does this mean that he thought philosophy ought to operate in the same way as the natural sciences? Does it mean that he took the laws of his descriptive psychology to describe natural features of consciousness? Would intentionality thus be a natural feature of the mind, in the way digestion is a natural feature of the body? This paper argues against such a view. It first discusses the nature of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which is said to be empirically based on inner perception. The laws of inner perception cannot be obtained by standard induction, since they are supposed to be exact (or strict) and exceptionless in the way mathematical theorems are. Inner perception is said to be evident in the sense that, in inner perception, experiences appear as they are. Even if this sort of evidence applies to each experience, it cannot serve as an inductive basis for the corresponding laws. How does Brentano move from the evidence delivered by each instance of inner perception to the exact laws of descriptive psychology? The paper argues that the laws of descriptive psychology are best understood as analytic statements, obtained through phenomenological analysis. Psychological concepts are analysed by inquiring into the way experiences appear in inner perception. Since experiences appear as they are, this sort of analysis reveals their nature. This, and not induction, grounds the claim that psychological laws are strict and exceptionless. Phenomenological analysis requires more than mere understanding: one must also be acquainted with the associated phenomena. Phenomenological analysis, contrary to the empiricist analysis of concepts, is not a priori. Brentano’s phenomenological analysis is compared with other forms of conceptual analysis. It is shown that it does not aim to deliver any form of metaphysical reduction (e.g., reducing all true statements to statements about experiences) or epistemological foundation (e.g., grounding all knowledge ultimately in inner perception). It is then shown how Brentano applies his methodology to intuitive judgements, as exemplified by formal axioms. The paper concludes with considerations on Brentano’s concept of truth, showing that his influential account of values (including truth) in terms of fitting response is a natural consequence of his general suggestion that central philosophical concepts—such as being, causality, and precisely truth—ought to be subjected to phenomenological analysis. This means that we must ask ourselves how truth appears to consciousness. Brentano thus questions the coherence of a concept of truth that could be applied without our understanding what it would take for it to be manifest in consciousness.