I argue that intentionality can be the mark of the mental, but only if we endorse a particular view about what intentionality is. First, and controversially, we need to distinguish intentionality from representation. I argue that the two phenomena are not the same, and their conflation in the literature is a mistake. I then argue that intentionality is apparent relationality. Our mental states are internal and non-relational, and their intentionality consists in their being metaphysically non-relational while seeming to be relational. While mental states are essentially intentional, I claim that they are only representational in virtue of their contingent connections to the environment, and that we might only be entitled to a sort of ‘representation by convention’ rather than genuine representation. However, I claim that the representational capacity of our mental states (whether contingent or only conventional) depends on their being essentially intentional. In other words, intentionality enables, but is not the same as, representation.