This chapter engages Habermas’s new genealogy of morals, focusing on its grounding in the Axial Age cognitive revolutions. It reconstructs how Habermas’s cognitivist orientation leads him to privilege the Judaic normative and dialogic model of moral authority, while insufficiently addressing the empathetic potentials found in Buddhism and Confucianism. This limitation is traced to his interpretation of the emergence of genuine moral thought in the Axial Age. The chapter’s aim is systematic: to broaden the range of moral sources and provide a more comprehensive grounding for moral motivation. This project aligns with Habermas’s later interest in religion as a resource for moral reasoning. The analysis details how he conceptualizes the Axial Age, highlights his emphasis on Judaism’s distinctiveness, examines his treatment of Buddhism and Confucianism, and ultimately argues for a more inclusive account of the motivational sources underpinning moral agency.